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MENTAL ILLNESS: A SMOKING GUN FOR 
FIREARMS RESTRICTIONS OR A MISSED 
TARGET? 
Mollie Gelburd 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Violent acts demand the nation’s attention.  Several of the most high-
profile mass shootings have involved both firearms and perpetrators with a 
record of mental health problems,1 which has ignited a media firestorm 
calling for legislative restrictions on firearms possession for the mentally ill.2 
Consequently, recent mass shooting events have become an impetus for state 
and federal legislative proposals concerning firearms restrictions.3 
The perception that mental illness is closely related to violence with a 
firearm transcends party lines, with even Republican representatives4 and 
firearms rights lobbying groups like the National Rifle Association5 looking 	  
     1.    Ian Urbina & Manny Fernandez, Virginia Tech Struggles to Recover from 
Shootings, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007 
/04/23/us/23vatech.html; Marc Lacey & David M. Herszenhorn, In Attack’s Wake, 
Political Repercussions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2011, at A1, http://www. 
nytimes.com/2011/01/09/us/politics/09giffords.html?pagewanted=all; Seth Cline, 
Bloomberg Challenges Obama and Romney on Gun Control After Colorado Shooting, 
U.S. NEWS (July 20, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2012/07/20/bloomberg 
-challenges-obama-and-romney-on-gun-control-after-colorado-shooting; Philip Caputo, 
Blame the Killing Machines: Guns, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2012, at A23. 
 2. Caputo, supra note 1 (suggesting, days after a school shooting in Newton, 
Connecticut, that all semi-automatic assault weapons should be banned); The Scourge of 
Concealed Weapons, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2012, at SR10 (asking that, in the wake of the 
shooting massacre in Newtown, Connecticut, lawmakers “devise new gun control 
strategies”); Emily Miller, Hide Your Guns; Democrats Vow to Pursue More Gun-
Control Laws, WASH. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.washingtontimes.com/ 
news/2012/sep/6/hide-your-guns/ (evaluating legislative proposals for firearms 
restrictions, including a ban on assault weapons); Cline, supra note 1 (outlining then-New 
York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s request for increased gun restrictions following 
the mass shooting in Aurora, Colorado). 
 3. Lindsey Lewis, Mental Illness, Propensity for Violence, and the Gun Control 
Act, 11 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 149, 173 (2011). 
 4. Public Safety and Second Amendment Rights Protection Act, PAT TOOMEY, U.S. 
SENATOR PA. (Apr. 10, 2013), http://www.toomey.senate.gov/?p=press _release&id=965 
(last visited May 1, 2013) (outlining a bipartisan legislative proposal introduced by Sens. 
Pat Toomey and Joe Manchin, which includes a provision providing for the creation of a 
commission to study acts of mass violence and mental illness). 
 5. Why the NRA Keeps Talking About Mental Illness, Rather than Guns, 
ECONOMIST (May 13, 2013, 10:00 PM), http://www.economist.com/ 
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for ways to stop mentally unstable individuals from purchasing or 
possessing weapons.  Representatives from all three branches of government 
have expressed similar sentiments:  President Obama, in his campaign for 
reelection in 2012, rolled out a “comprehensive gun strategy” to keep 
firearms out of the hands of the “mentally ill;”6 lawmakers have used 
shooting tragedies as stepping-stones for political platforms7 and the U.S. 
Supreme Court, in 2008, upheld “longstanding prohibitions” on firearms 
possession by “the mentally ill.”8  Additionally, nearly half of Americans 
consider the mental health system more to blame for mass shooting events 
than easy access to guns, drug use, violent video games, the promulgation of 
extremist views, and insufficient property security. 9   Despite this 
overwhelming bipartisan and public support, individuals in the scientific and 
medical communities have acknowledged the disproportionate emphasis on 
firearms restraints on the mentally ill and questioned whether this actually 
“reflects sound public policy or is a manifestation of exaggerated public 
perceptions of the danger associated with mental illness.”10 
The Gun Control Act of 1968,11 as amended, contains the principal federal 
restrictions on the commerce related to and possession of domestic firearms.  
The Gun Control Act codifies categorical restrictions on possession by 
certain classes of individuals, including the two-prong restriction that 
pertains to anyone “adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been 
	  
blogs/lexington/2013/03/guns-and-mentally-ill (last visited June 11, 2013) (quoting 
National Rifle Association spokesman Wayne LaPierre: “We have no national database 
of these lunatics. . . . We have a completely cracked mentally ill system [sic] that’s got 
these monsters walking the streets”). 
 6. President Barack Obama’s Remarks During the 2012 Presidential Debate at 
Hofstra University (Oct. 16, 2013). Transcript available at: 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/decision2012/2012-presidential-debate-
president-obama-and-mitt-romneys-remarks-at-hofstra-university-on-oct-16-running-
transcript/2012/10/16/be8bfb9a-17dd-11e2-9855-71f2b202721b_story.html. 
 7. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 2.  
 8. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626-27 (2008). 
 9. Americans Fault Mental Health System Most for Gun Violence, GALLUP POLL 
(Sept. 20, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/164507/americans-fault-mental-health-
system-gun-violence.aspx.  In September of 2013, 48% of Americans blamed the mental 
health system for mass shootings, and fewer blame easy access to guns (40%), drug use 
(37%), violence in movies and video games (32%), spread of extremist views via the 
Internet (29%), insufficient security in public places such as schools and businesses 
(29%), and inflammatory language by political commenters (18%).    
 10. Paul S. Appelbaum & Jeffrey W. Swanson, Gun Laws and Mental Illness: How 
Sound Are Restrictions?, 61 L. & PSYCHIATRY 652, 653 (2010). 
 11. 18 U.S.C. § 921 (2006), et seq. 
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committed to a mental institution.”12  This amendment to the Gun Control 
Act represents the first time Congress was able to impose commercial 
restraints on firearms “sales to those suffering from mental illness.”13  The 
purpose of the prohibitive categories is rooted in promoting public safety; 
specifically, the groupings are intended to deny classes of people determined 
to be of a special risk access to firearms.14  Currently, the special risk groups 
identified by the Act include: felons, fugitives from justice, unlawful users 
of controlled substances, anyone adjudicated as a mental defective or 
committed to a mental institution, illegal aliens or those admitted to the 
United States on a nonimmigrant visa, anyone who has renounced United 
States citizenship, anyone dishonorably discharged from the military, 
anyone under certain restraining orders relating to an intimate partner or 
child, anyone convicted of a misdemeanor of domestic violence,15 and 
minors under 18.16 
To achieve the intended result of promoting public safety, the Gun 
Control Act’s prohibitions hinge on the existence and validity of the 
following presumptions: 1) that lawmakers are able to forecast the type of 
individuals that pose a greater risk of gun violence than other categories of 
people; 2) that the statutory text pertaining to the restrictive categories 
adequately describes and comprehensively encompasses risky individuals;17 
and 3) that there are effective enforcement mechanisms in place that prevent 
those individuals identified in the law from taking possession of firearms. 
The focus of this Note is on the relationship between gun legislation and 
mental illness; therefore the following pertains to the prohibitive category 
“adjudicated as a mental defective” or “committed to a mental institution,” 
which is codified at 18 U.S.C. sections 922(g)(4) and 922(d)(4).  This 	  
 12. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (prohibiting these individuals from possession firearms). 
See also 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(4) (criminalizing the sale or transfer of firearms to these 
persons). 
 13. See Anthony P. Dunbar, Torts—Liability of A Gun Dealer for Selling to a 
“Mental Incompetent”, 58 TUL. L. REV. 1263, 1265-66 (1984). 
 14. See Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 824 (1974) (“The principal 
purpose of the federal gun control legislation . . . was to curb crime by keeping ‘firearms 
out of the hands of those not legally entitled to possess them because of age, criminal 
background, or incompetency.”) (quoting S. REP. NO. 1501, at 22 (1968)). See also 
Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 218 (1976) (“Congress . . . sought broadly to keep 
firearms away from the persons Congress classified as potentially irresponsible and 
dangerous. These persons are comprehensively barred by the Act from acquiring firearms 
by any means.”). 
 15. 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1)-(9). 
 16. Id. at § 922(b)(1). 
 17. See generally Jeffrey Swanson, Good News and Bad News About Gun Laws, 
Mental Illness and Violence—Part 1, HARV. L. BLOG (Oct. 5, 2012), 
https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/billofhealth/2012/10/05/good-news-and-bad-news-about-
gun-laws-mental-illness-and-violence-part-1/ (last visited May 1, 2014). 
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category raises concerns with respect to all three presumptions.  First, 
scientific research examining the relationship between mental disorders and 
a propensity for violence is inconclusive,18 and researchers studying the 
topic have warned that developing a “generalizable set of criteria for 
dangerous prediction in law and mental health” has been described as “an 
elusive and distant objective.”19 
Second, assuming such a relationship exists, federal legislation, as written, 
is ambiguous and unclear, making it difficult to apply the law in any 
practical sense.20  The term “mental defect” could cover a broad range of 
cognitive disorders, ranging from an intellectual disability to any 
diagnosable mental illness. 
Lastly, on a procedural level, in order to identify and flag prohibited 
persons, federal firearms law utilizes a background check system, which is 
reliant upon the quality and quantity of disqualifying records.  State 
participation in providing disqualifying records to the federal database is 
voluntary and reporting has proved to vary widely among states, with some 
states over-reporting and others failing to report noncriminal records at all.21  
Additionally, background checks only apply to future purchases, and do not 
prevent prohibited persons from gaining access to firearms through a 
housemate, at an unregulated gun show, or even from retaining possession of 
once lawfully possessed firearms following an event that would otherwise 
disqualify them from handling weapons.22 
This Note will review more closely the three above outlined 
presumptions.  Section II of this Note will examine in closer detail the 
relevant federal law regulating firearms.  Section III will review the growing 
body of state law that purports to more heavily regulate firearms possession.  
Next, Section IV will set forth the breadth of mental illness research and 
suggests that mass shootings should be reviewed as an additional area of 	  
 18. See infra Section IV.  
 19. James Bonta, et al., The Prediction of Criminal and Violent Recidivism Among 
Mentally Disordered Offenders: A Meta-Analysis, 123 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN 123, 
124 (1998). 
 20. See, e.g., United States v. Hansel, 474 F.2d 1120, 1123 (8th Cir. 1973) (“[W]e 
are left to ourselves to determine the meaning of the term ‘mental defective’ . . . without 
any revealing guides as to the intent of Congress.”). 
 21. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL 
INSTANT CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECK SYSTEM 3 (2000); see also U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-684, GUN CONTROL, SHARING  PROMISING PRACTICES 
AND ASSESSING INCENTIVES COULD BETTER POSITION JUSTICE TO ASSIST IN PROVIDING 
RECORDS FOR BACKGROUND CHECKS 9 (2012). 
 22. A small minority of states have established procedures for confiscating firearms 
from individuals. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 35-33-1-1.5 (permitting a law enforcement 
officer responding to an alleged crime of domestic violence to confiscate a firearm from 
the scene). 
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study, apart from the study of the relation between mental illness and general 
violence. 
II. FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW REGULATING FIREARMS 
Two federal statutes set forth the principal guidelines regulating the 
commerce in and possession of firearms by private individuals: the National 
Firearms Act of 1934 (“NFA”) 23  and the Gun Control Act of 1968 
(“GCA”).24  The NFA was originally enacted in 1934 to strictly regulate and 
tax “gangster” weapons, such as machine guns, firearm mufflers and 
silencers, short-barreled shotguns and rifles, destructive devices, and “any 
other weapon” defined in the Act.25  As enacted, the NFA established a 
registry of weapons within its purview, which includes information 
identifying the firearm, the firearm’s owner, and the date of registration.26 
On the other hand, the GCA covers conventional weapons, such as 
handguns, shotguns, and rifles, and applies to anyone in the business of 
manufacturing, importing, selling, or transferring firearms, by requiring that 
merchants obtain a federal license and comply with strict guidelines.27  All 
federally licensed dealers must abide by the provisions of the GCA and its 
implementing federal regulations, which require keeping meticulous records 
of all firearms sales and recording the identity of all purchasers.28  Private 
citizens, at least at the federal level, do not need a license to purchase or 
possess a conventional firearm, or to effectuate the private transfer of a 
firearm to another individual.29 
Since its inception, the legislative aim of the GCA has been to aid law 
enforcement officers in curbing violence “by keeping ‘firearms out of the 
hands of those not legally entitled to possess them because of age, criminal 
background, or incompetency.’” 30   As enacted in 1968, however, the 
regulations on firearms sales to the enumerated categories of prohibited 	  
 23. National Firearms Act, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236, 1236-40 (1934) (codified as 
amended at 26 U.S.C. ch. 53). 
 24. 18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq. 
 25. 26 U.S.C. § 5845(e). 
 26. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS, 
AND EXPLOSIVES, ATF NATIONAL FIREARMS ACT HANDBOOK (2009). 
 27. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(a). 
 28. Id.  See also 27 C.F.R. Part 478 (containing the implementing administrative 
regulations under the GCA). 
 29. While there is no license requirement at the federal level, a minority of states, 
such as Hawaii, Illinois, and New Jersey, require private citizens to obtain a license or 
permit before possessing or acquiring certain firearms.  See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-
2 (2013); 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 65/1 et seq. (2013); N.J. STAT. § 2C:58-3 (2013). 
 30. Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 824 (1974) (quoting S. REP. NO. 
1501, at 22 (1968)).  
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persons contained no identification verification method; the GCA provided 
only that it was unlawful for a dealer to sell or dispose of a weapon if the 
dealer knew or had reasonable cause to know that the potential buyer was 
within a prohibited category,31 and further provided that it was unlawful for 
a prohibited person to possess a firearm.32  This meant that, to effectuate a 
firearms sale to a potential buyer, a dealer needed only to verify with the 
potential purchaser himself that he was not within one of the restricted 
categories.33 
The need for a more effective enforcement mechanism became 
immediately apparent; 34  however it was not until the Brady Handgun 
Violence Prevention Act, implemented in 1993, that a background check 
requirement was codified.35 
The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (“Brady Act”), proposed as 
an amendment to the GCA in 1987, was a response to mounting violence 
involving firearms across the United States and was galvanized by and 
named for the assassination attempt on President Reagan, which left White 
House Press Secretary, James Brady, disabled.36   The Brady Act laid 
dormant until 1993, at which point it received bipartisan support in both the 
House and Senate and was signed into law by President Bill Clinton on 
November 30, 1993.37  Its object was to create a waiting period for all 
handgun purchases made from federally licensed sellers, so that local law 
enforcement agents could conduct a background check into the potential 
purchaser’s personal history using any available criminal or noncriminal 
records.38  There were two stages of the Brady Act—the interim stage, 
codified in section 922(s) of the GCA, and the permanent stage, codified in 
section 922(t).  The purpose of the interim stage was to allow the federal 	  
 31. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d) (emphasis added). 
 32. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). 
 33. See Michael J. Delaney, Lethal Weapon: Will Tenth Amendment Challenges Kill 
the Brady Act?, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217, 1219-20 (1995) (“Without the requirement of a 
waiting period and background check, the Gun Control Act, instead, relied upon self-
certification whereby a prospective gun purchaser would sign a sworn statement attesting 
to their capacity to purchase a firearm”); but see Richard M. Aborn, The Battle Over the 
Brady Bill and the Future of Gun Control Advocacy, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 417, 418 n. 
11 (1995) (indicating that some states implemented their own enforcement mechanisms 
through a background check system, but there was no such system at the federal level at 
the inception of the GCA). 
 34. Delaney, supra note 33, at 1219. 
 35. Dyan Finguerra, The Tenth Amendment Shoots Down the Brady Act, 3 J.L. & 
POL’Y 637, 639 (1995); see also Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. 
No.103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993) (codified as amended). 
 36. Finguerra, supra note 35, at 637-41.  The man who perpetrated the shooting had 
a “history of mental instability” yet “easily obtained a handgun.”  Id. at 637.  
 37. Id. at 640. 
 38. Id. 
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government time to develop a national background check system, aptly 
named the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (“NICS”) 
and run by the Federal Bureau of Investigations (“FBI”), which would create 
a comprehensive system of state and federal records disqualifying prohibited 
persons.39  Under the interim provisions, set to expire on November 30, 
1998, federally licensed firearms sellers would conduct background checks 
by contacting the purchaser’s chief local law enforcement officer (generally 
a police officer or sheriff), who would then have five days to conduct a 
reasonable investigation into the potential purchaser’s personal records to 
determine if they were a lawful purchaser.40 
Before the interim provisions sunset in November of 1998, two state law 
enforcement officers challenged the constitutionality of the Brady Act, 
arguing that Congress could not compel them, as state officials, to 
participate in a federal regulatory program.41  The Supreme Court agreed, 
holding in the 1997 decision, Printz v. United States, that the Brady Act 
unconstitutionally required state officials to conduct background checks 
pursuant to a federal program.42  Printz had a considerable impact on Tenth 
Amendment jurisprudence, in that it strongly reinforced state sovereignty 
vis-à-vis the federal government,43 and curtailed the effectiveness of the 
Brady Act by making state participation in the NICS voluntary and not 
mandatory.44 
Post-Printz, the federal government cannot require state executive branch 
employees to conduct background investigations; however all federally 
licensed dealers must still run background checks (with very limited 
exceptions)45 before transferring any private purchaser a firearm.46  More 
importantly, the Printz decision also meant that states were no longer 
compelled to provide disqualifying records to the federal program, and 
consequently, most records that populate the NICS database are from federal 
sources.47 	  
 39. See 28 C.F.R. § 25.5 (2013). 
 40. Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No.103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 
(1993). 
 41. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 904 (1997); see also Finguerra, supra 
note 35, at 641-45. 
 42. Printz, 521 U.S. at 934-35 (finding the interim provisions of the Brady Act 
unconstitutional).  
 43. Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and 
Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2195-96 (1998). 
 44. Id. at 2184-85. 
 45. See 27 C.F.R. § 478.102(d) (2013) (enumerating exemptions for NICS checks, 
which include if the potential firearms purchaser is a licensed seller). 
 46. Id. at §§ 478.102(a)-(c). 
 47. 28 C.F.R. § 25.4 (“It is anticipated that most records in the NICS Index will be 
obtained from Federal agencies. It is also anticipated that a limited number of authorized 
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The background check system currently works as follows.  Before 
transferring a firearm to a potential purchaser, a federal firearms dealer must 
check the individual’s identifying information against the records in the 
NICS database and receive a result of proceed, delay, or deny, typically 
within a few minutes.48  In a properly functioning system, a denial indicates 
that the potential purchaser was associated with a disqualifying record and 
the transfer must not proceed.49  A delay can occur when records in the 
database are incomplete or missing and require that the firearms dealer 
undertake additional research in order to make a determination regarding the 
inquiring buyer.50  After three business days, however, even if the dealer 
failed to obtain a “proceed” response, he may continue with the transfer of 
the weapon.51 
Even a brief overview of the NICS exemplifies how the effect of a 
background check is premised on the quality, quantity, and availability of 
disqualifying records.  Reports during the early stages of the implementation 
of the NICS indicate that, as feared by federal authorities, states were 
neglecting to provide disqualifying records to the NICS, particularly 
noncriminal records.52 
The deficiencies of the NICS were not seriously addressed by legislators 
until the shooting massacre at Virginia Tech on April 16, 2007, when a 
gunman, who was ordered by a Virginia magistrate to stay overnight in a 
psychiatric hospital in December of 2005, killed 32 people after successfully 
purchasing the two pistols he used in his massacre.53  Under federal law, 	  
state and local law enforcement agencies will voluntarily contribute records to the NICS 
Index. Information in the NCIC and III systems that will be searched during a 
background check has been or will be contributed voluntarily by Federal, state, local, and 
international criminal justice agencies.”). 
 48. 28 C.F.R §§ 25.6(a)-(c). 
 49. Id. at § 25.6(c)(1)(iv)(C).  
 50. Id. at § 25.6(c)(1)(iv)(B). 
 51. Id.  
 52. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (2000), supra note 21, at 5.  
 53. MASS SHOOTINGS AT VIRGINIA TECH, REPORT OF THE VA. TECH REVIEW PANEL 
(Aug. 2007), available at https://governor.virginia.gov/TempContent/techPanel 
Reportcfm. [hereinafter REPORT OF THE VA. TECH REVIEW PANEL]. After conducting an 
extensive review into the Virginia Tech shooter’s past, a panel concluded that the shooter 
exhibited signs of mental instability since childhood. While enrolled as a student at 
Virginia Tech, the shooter invoked the attention of authorities after he sent messages to 
his suitemate stating he “might as well kill [him]self.”  As a result, on December 13, 
2005, a social worker with the New River Valley Community Services Board, a public 
agency that provides behavioral health services to area residents, recommended 
committing the shooter and located a psychiatric bed at a local hospital. A Virginia 
magistrate then concluded that the student was “an imminent danger to self or others” and 
issued a temporary detention order, resulting in an overnight stay in a local hospital’s 
psychiatric department.  The following day, on December 14, 2005, a commitment 
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regulations promulgated under the GCA define a commitment to a mental 
institution as requiring “[a] determination by a court, board, commission, or 
other lawful authority that a person, as a result of . . . mental illness . . . [i]s a 
danger to himself or to others.”54   Virginia law in place at the time 
prohibited firearms possession by any individual adjudicated as “legally 
incompetent” or “mentally incapacitated,” or by anyone admitted as a patient 
to an institution on an involuntary basis.55  The Virginia Tech shooter was 
ordered an overnight stay in a hospital, but was never formally admitted to 
an institution for an inpatient stay, adjudicated as being incompetent or 
otherwise disqualified from firearms ownership under Virginia law.  
Consequently, his name was never entered into the database of disqualifying 
records, and he was able to purchase firearms from a licensed dealer without 
triggering a denial.  
Within days of the shooting, Congress proposed new legislation, the NICS 
Improvement Amendments Act of 2007 (“NIAA”),56 in an effort to fix the 
loopholes in the system and to incentivize state participation in the NICS.  
The bill was signed into law by President George W. Bush in January 2008 
as an amendment to the GCA.57  The NIAA amendments were mainly in the 
form of grants to states and were aimed at encouraging them to supply the 
NICS with records, particularly any disqualifying mental health records, for 
upgrading their electronic systems, and for collecting and analyzing records 
to populate the databases with.58 
The Government Accountability Office reviewed the status of the NICS 
following the implementation of the NIAA and reported that mental health 
records provided by states increased by a dramatic 800 percent, from 
126,000 to 1.2 million records in 2011.59  The increase, albeit encouraging, 
was due in large part to the efforts of just twelve states;60 thirty states failed 
to provide any noncriminal records to the database, even after the NIAA was 	  
hearing was held and an independent psychologist and hospital psychiatrist indicated the 
shooter was not a danger to himself or others, and a special justice overseeing the 
proceeding ordered treatment as an outpatient, finding “there [was] no indication of 
psychosis, delusions, suicidal or homicidal ideation.” The shooter was then released with 
instructions to follow up with the college’s counseling services, which he failed to do.  Id. 
 54. 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2012).  Excluded from the federal regulatory definition is a 
commitment for the purpose of observation or a voluntary admission to an institution.  Id.  
 55. REPORT OF THE VA. TECH REVIEW PANEL, supra note 53. See also VA CODE § 
18.2-308.1:2 (2007); VA CODE § 18.2-308.1:3 (2007). 
 56. NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110-180, 121 Stat. 2559 
(2008). 
 57. Id. 
 58. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (2012) supra note 21, at 9, 28. 
 59. Id. at 9.  
 60. Id.  
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passed.61  States that were negligent in their participation cited technological 
challenges, conflicting state privacy laws, insufficient funding, and a lack of 
incentive as factors that limited their ability to provide records.62 
A. Interpreting the Meaning of “Mental Defective” and “Committed to A 
Mental Institution” 
The Virginia Tech tragedy drew attention to the ambiguity of the 
definitions contained in the GCA and revealed how state law definitions can 
be conflicting.  When the GCA was enacted, it was the first time that 
lawmakers were able to pass legislation banning firearms sales to individuals 
considered to be “mentally defective,” 63  however there is very limited 
“available legislative history [that] provide[s] a clear statement of how [the] 
peculiar language of section 922(d)(4) [and 922(g)(4)] was chosen.” 64  
Generally, when a statute contains ambiguous language, the legislative 
history serves to clarify lawmakers’ intent.  Legislators spoke of restricting 
the following individuals from gun ownership: “psychotics,” 65 
“psychopaths,”66 “the mentally deficient,”67 “mentally unstable,”68 “persons 
with a history of mental disturbances,”69 “mentally delinquent,”70 “antisocial 
or violence prone,”71 and “deranged persons.”72  
Congress eventually settled on and codified the selected language, 
however, the congressional record does little to help make a practical 
determination as to who should be restricted from firearms possession.73  
B. Guidance from Federal Regulations 
In an effort to clarify and more narrowly define the federal statutory 
language, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 	  
 61. Id. at Introduction, 21. 
 62. Id. at 11-13. 
 63. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(d) (1982); see also Dunbar, supra note 13, at 1265-66. 
 64. Dunbar, supra note 13, at 1265. 
 65. Id. (citing 114 CONG. REC. 23070 (1968) (remarks of Rep. Anderson)).  
 66. Dunbar, supra note 13 at 1265 (citing 114 CONG. REC. 27404 (1968) (remarks of 
Sen. Percy)).  
 67. Dunbar, supra note 13, at 1265 (citing 114 CONG. REC. 23072 (1968) (remarks of 
Rep. Horton)).  
 68. 114 CONG. REC. 13220 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Tydings). 
 69. Id. at 21784 (remarks of Rep. Celler). 
 70. Id. at 21781 (1968) (remarks of Rep. Sikes). 
 71. Id. at 21817 (1968) (remarks of Rep. Schwengel).  
 72. Id. at  21819 (1968) (remarks of Rep. Halpern). 
 73. See Dunbar, supra note 13, at 1265-66; see also Jana R. McCreary, Falling 
between the Atkins and Heller Cracks: Intellectual Disabilities and Firearms, 15 CHAP. 
L. REV. 271, 285 (2011). 
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(“ATF”), now operating under the Department of Justice,74 promulgated 
administrative regulations under the GCA.75  Under ATF’s regulations, in 
order to be “adjudicated as a mental defective,” a court or other lawful 
authority must find that a person, “as a result of marked subnormal 
intelligence or mental illness, incompetency, condition, or disease” is either 
a danger to himself or others, or lacks the mental capacity to contract or 
manage his own affairs.76  This includes “[a] finding of insanity by a court in 
a criminal case,” and anyone “found incompetent to stand trial or found not 
guilty by reason of lack of mental responsibility pursuant to the [relevant 
articles of] Uniform Code of Military Justice.”77  It is noteworthy that this 
definition expands “mental defect” to encompass both diminished 
intellectual capacity and mental illness, but also adds an element that 
requires a finding of either dangerousness or incompetency. 
The second prong of federal legislation, “committed to a mental 
institution” was clarified by ATF’s regulations to mean any “formal 
commitment of a person to a mental institution” by a court or lawful 
authority, where the commitment is pursuant to “mental defectiveness or 
mental illness” or for drug use. 78   Formal commitments, under the 
regulation, do not include persons hospitalized for observation or on a 
voluntary basis.79 
The Department of Justice recently recognized “that the term ‘mental 
defective’ is outdated,” however, as an administrative body, it cannot amend 
the statutory text.  As a result, the Department proposed a new rule to amend 
the regulatory definition to include anyone “found not guilty by reason of 
insanity, mental disease or defect, or lack of mental responsibility by a court 
in a criminal case,” “persons found guilty but mentally ill by a court in a 
criminal case in a jurisdiction that provides for such a finding,” and also 
“[t]hose persons found incompetent to stand trial by a court in a criminal 
case.”80  The proposed regulatory definition of “mental defect” also excludes 
certain people from the prohibited persons category, if a person petitions for 
relief from the disability under either federal or state law.81 
	  
 74. ATF’s History, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES,   
http://www.atf.gov/about/history/index.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2013). 
 75. See generally 27 C.F.R. Part 478 (2012). 
 76. Id. § 478.11 (defining the term “adjudicated as a mental defective”). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. 
 80. Amended Definition of “Adjudicated as a Mental Defective” and “Committed to 
a Mental Institution,” 79 Fed. Reg. 774-01 (Jan. 7, 2014). 
 81. Id. 
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The federal regulatory definitions of “mental defect” and “committed to a 
mental institution” are merely persuasive, not dispositive, in courts. 82  
Accordingly, federal courts have taken a variety of approaches when 
interpreting GCA terms: some jurisdictions accept and apply the federal 
regulations, which contain an element requiring a finding of either 
dangerousness or incapacity,83 while other jurisdictions expressly decline to 
consider federal regulations when analyzing cases under the GCA, in favor 
of either following previous judicial precedent decided prior to the 
implementation of the regulations,84 or in favor of deferring to state law 
definitions.85 
C. The Supreme Court: Upholding Longstanding Restrictions 
Despite legislative efforts to further restrict and more heavily regulate the 
use of firearms, the Supreme Court unequivocally expanded the right to bear 
arms in the 2008 decision, District of Columbia v. Heller86 and the 2010 
decision McDonald v. Chicago.87  Together, these cases held that the right to 
keep and bear arms for self-defense in a home is an individual, albeit 
limited, right and is incorporated and applicable to the states.88  Both cases 
tackled the broad issue of reviewing the Second Amendment and 
determining the constitutionality of city ordinances that effectively 
precluded residents from possessing firearms in their homes.89  As a result, 
since the Court was answering conceptual constitutional questions, the 
opinions in both Heller and McDonald avoided addressing more practical 	  
 82. See, e.g., United States v. B.H., 466 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1146 (N.D. Iowa 2006). 
 83. United States v. Vertz, 102 F. Supp. 2d 787, 788 (W.D. Mich. 2000) aff’d, 40 F. 
App’x 69 (6th Cir. 2002) (applying the federal regulatory definition of “adjudicated as a 
mental defective” and holding that, since there was no requisite judicial finding of 
dangerousness or incapacity, the defendant’s “adjudication is not sufficient to bring [him] 
within the statute”).  Id. 
 84. B.H., 466 F. Supp. 2d at 1146 (declining to use the “broader” definition of 
“mental defective” defined in ATF regulations and instead holding that “the phrase 
‘mental defective’ is a term of art with a long history in psychology and the law”). The 
Court in B.H. was “bound to follow” precedent set forth in United States v. Hansel, 474 
F.2d 1120 (8th Cir. 1973), decided prior to the adoption of ATF regulations, which held 
that “mental defective as used in the Gun Control Act does not include mental illness,” 
but instead refers to a “person who has never possessed a normal degree of intellectual 
capacity.”  Hansel, 474 F.2d at 1123-25. 
 85. See, e.g., United States v. Rehlander, 666 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2012).  
 86. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 87. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
 88. See id. at 3021.  While the opinion is a plurality, a majority of 5-4 held that the 
Second Amendment is applicable to the states.  However Justice Thomas stated a 
different basis for incorporation.  See id. at 3058 (Thomas, J., concurring in part). 
 89. Heller, 554 U.S. at 576; McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3026. 
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concerns, such as the scope of particular provisions of legislation that restrict 
firearms to a lesser degree than outright local bans.90 
The Heller analysis focused on the text of the Second Amendment,91 
which provides that: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the 
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall 
not be infringed.”92  Writing for a 5-4 majority in Heller, Justice Antonin 
Scalia interpreted the scope of the Second Amendment by reviewing its 
express text and engaging in an extensive analysis of its history, which 
extends back to the English Bill of Rights in the seventeenth century,93 and 
found that: “There . . . [is] no doubt, on the basis of both text and history, 
that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear 
arms.”94 
The Heller controversy arose after Dick Heller, a police officer in the 
District of Columbia, was refused a certificate to register a handgun in his 
home under District of Columbia laws that effectively banned handgun 
ownership in homes.95  Mr. Heller sought to enjoin the District of Columbia 
from enforcing the laws, challenging the provisions on Second Amendment 
grounds.96  The Supreme Court agreed with Heller and overturned two 
District of Columbia statutes restricting handgun use, reasoning that 
handguns are a “quintessential self-defense weapon,” and that defense of the 
home, of all places, is paramount.97  
1. Second Amendment Rights Are Not Absolute 
The Heller Court was quick to limit the scope of the Second Amendment 
and stated the rights it confers are not absolute.98  Justice Scalia indicated 
that there are certain restrictions that have been historically understood to 
limit potential harm and prevent individuals who pose a risk to society from 
possessing weapons.99  In contrast to the extensive historical analysis used to 	  
 90. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3108 (noting that “[t]he practical impact of various 
gun-control measures may be highly controversial, but this basic insight should not be”). 
 91. Heller, 554 U.S. at 576. 
 92. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 93. See generally Heller, 554 U.S. at 618-28 (describing the historical context of the 
Second Amendment). 
 94. Id. at 595. 
 95. Id. at 574-76. 
 96. Id. at 575-76. 
 97. Id. at 574-75, 628–29, 635 (overturning two District of Columbia statutes, one 
banning handgun possession in homes and another requiring that all lawful guns in a 
home be locked; a third statute regarding licensing was also contested by Heller, however 
the Court did not reach the validity of this statute). 
 98. Id. at 626. 
 99. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626-27, n.26 (2008). 
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justify the holding of Heller, Justice Scalia raises, then dismisses the 
“presumptively lawful regulatory measures,” writing (albeit in dicta) that: 
Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical 
analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, 
nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on 
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by 
felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying 
of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and 
government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and 
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.100 
Chief Justice Stevens, in his dissent to the McDonald opinion, which 
addressed a similar citywide handgun ban in Chicago, recognized that this 
text from Heller provided little guidance on how to apply or interpret the 
longstanding prohibitions and presumptively lawful regulations referenced 
in Heller.101  Justice Stevens warned that Heller “unleashed . . . a tsunami of 
legal uncertainty, and thus litigation,”102 and that the Court “haphazardly 
created a few simple rules, such as that it will not touch prohibitions on the 
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill,” simply because they 
“sound sensible.”103  “But why these rules and not others?” Justice Stevens 
asked, “[d]oes the Court know that these regulations are justified by some 
special gun-related risk of death?  In fact, the Court does not know.”104  
Stevens questioned the use of empirical studies that allegedly support such 
regulations, such as expert calculations on how many lives were saved by 
Chicago’s handgun ban, and wondered how to consider any existing 
counter-studies raised by opponents to the ban. Judges do not know the 
answers to empirically based questions that may inform the need for a 
particular form of gun regulation, which makes it difficult for them to weigh 
the strength of a particular state interest cited as justification against an 
individual’s right to bear arms.105  
2. The Impending Legal Tsunami  
Following the Heller decision, the First Circuit was asked to decide, in the 
2012 case United States v. Rehlander,106 whether a temporary emergency 
	  
 100. Id. 
 101. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3127 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
 102. Id. at 3105. 
 103. Id. at 3127. 
 104. Id.  
 105. Id.  
 106. United States v. Rehlander, 666 F.3d 45, 46 (1st Cir. 2012). 
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hospitalization pursuant to a Maine statute107 constituted a commitment 
within the meaning of the GCA.108  The Court found that it did not, and that 
for the purposes of the GCA, “committed to any mental institution,” does 
not include temporary emergency hospitalizations, for the following reasons: 
such procedures are accompanied only by an ex parte hearing; are 
temporary, emergency “hospitalizations,” as opposed to “commitments;” and 
because Maine law provides a different method for effectuating a full-scale 
commitment, which carries with it a state prohibition against firearms 
ownership, which presumptively creates a GCA ban as well.109  In deciding 
Rehlander, the First Circuit overturned a line of precedent holding 
otherwise. 110   The Rehlander Court pointed out that Heller adds a 
“constitutional component” to future considerations of firearms rights 
revocations, and that the rights conferred by the Second Amendment cannot 
be “withdrawn by government on a permanent and irrevocable basis without 
due process.”111  The First Circuit also noted that deprivation of firearms 
rights under federal law is currently permanent, with no mechanism to 	  
 107. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 34–B, § 3863 (2012). This statute provides that an individual 
may be “admitted to a psychiatric hospital on an emergency basis” following ex parte 
procedures, pursuant to an application by a healthcare professional or law enforcement 
officer and a certification from a judge confirming proper procedures were followed.  In 
contrast, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 34–B, § 3864 (2012) provides a more detailed  process for 
the involuntary “commitment” of an individual, which is accompanied by a full 
adversarial judicial proceeding.  Maine law actually prohibits firearm possession by an 
individual committed under section 3864, but not section 3863, which the Rehlander 
Court found persuasive in declining to bring section 3863 commitments within the 
meaning of the GCA.  See Rehlander, 666 F.3d at 49. 
 108. Rehlander, 666 F.3d at 47.  Nathan Rehlander, the petitioner, had been 
hospitalized under ME. REV. STAT. tit. 34–B, § 3863 on March 28, 2007 after he self-
reported a suicide attempt and a crisis clinician determined that he “was mentally ill” 
(specifically, he was bipolar and a paranoid schizophrenic) and posed a likelihood of 
serious harm, as indicated by his self-proclaimed plan to hang himself.  This report was 
certified by a nurse practitioner.  A social worker and doctor subsequently agreed with 
the prior opinions, finding that Mr. Rehlander posed a “likelihood of serious harm” and 
exhibited symptoms of mental illness, such as “elevated mood, pressured speech, 
distractibility” and “increased grandiosity; disorganized thoughts; placing self and others 
in harm’s way in imminent manner, delusional.”  Authorities initiated a full-scale 
commitment proceeding under section 3864, however the judge found that the state did 
not meet its burden in proving an adequate basis for the full-scale involuntary 
commitment under that provision.  United States v. Rehlander, 685 F. Supp. 2d 159, 161 
(D. Me. 2010) rev’d, 666 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2012). 
 109. Rehlander, 666 F.3d at 49-50 (emphasis added). 
 110. Id. at 46 & n. 1 (overturning United States v. Chamberlain, which held that an 
emergency involuntary commitment without an adversarial hearing or judicial 
determination is a “commitment” within the meaning of section 922 (g)(4)); 
Chamberlain, 159 F.3d 656 (1st Cir. 1998). 
 111. Rehlander, 666 F.3d at 48. 
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petition for relief at the federal level,112 and that “[i]t could . . . be different if 
section 922 permitted one temporarily hospitalized on an emergency basis to 
recover, on reasonable terms, a suspended right to possess arms on a 
showing that he now no longer posed a risk of danger.”113 
The Rehlander decision is noteworthy for several reasons: it considers 
Heller as adding a constitutional component to future inquiries; it addresses 
the permanency of firearms prohibitions under federal law; and it raises an 
important question regarding the relationship between state laws providing 
for commitments or hospitalizations and the GCA.114  The Rehlander Court 
recognized that other federal appellate courts had not yet applied Heller to 
similar cases, and noted the split among courts.115 
III. STATE LAWS 
States may enact legislation that more strictly regulates firearms use, 
generally by restricting possession by certain categories of people (as federal 
law does) or by restricting gun use in certain locations.  Several states have 
expanded on the national prohibited persons categories to include broadly 
defined groups, such as Hawaii, which includes anyone who has “been 
diagnosed as having a significant behavioral, emotional, or mental disorders 
as defined by the most current diagnostic manual of the American 
Psychiatric Association or for treatment for organic brain syndromes.”116  
Several states apply the prohibition to individuals who are “intellectually 
disabled,” such as Illinois117  and Florida; the latter definition includes 
anyone who, “as a result of marked subnormal intelligence, or mental 
illness, incompetency, condition, or disease, is a danger to himself or herself 
or to others or lacks the mental capacity to contract or manage his or her 
own affairs.”118 
California has enacted what is seemingly the most comprehensive 
legislation in the country regarding firearms restrictions for individuals with 
behavioral disorders.119  The California Code enumerates several situations 
wherein healthcare professionals or law enforcement officers can alert to a 	  
 112. Although 18 U.S.C. § 922(c) allows individuals who have had their firearms 
privileges revoked to petition for reinstatement, Congress has repeatedly withdrawn 
funding from the ATF to investigate such petitions. See Gregory J. Pals, Judicial Review 
of Firearms Disabilities, 76 WASH. U. L. REV. 1095, 1097 (1998). 
 113. Rehlander, 666 F.3d at 49 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id., at 48 and at n. 1.  
 116. HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-7. 
 117. ILL. COMP. STAT. 720- §5/24-3.1 (prohibiting possession of firearms and 
ammunition by these individuals). 
 118. FLA. STAT. § 790.065(4). 
 119. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 8100, et seq. (2014). 
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patient or threatening individual in order to have the individual’s firearms 
rights temporarily or permanently revoked, depending on the applicable 
provision.120  One of the key elements of the California Code is that it 
provides for situations where firearms deprivation can be temporary, such as 
for a term of six months, five years, or throughout the duration of an 
inpatient hospitalization, and also provides a mechanism that allows 
individuals to petition for relief from the firearms restriction once the 
prohibitory period expires.121 
Specifically, California restricts individuals from possessing firearms for a 
six-month period if a psychologist determines the individual presents a 
threat of physical violence against a “reasonably identifiable victim.”122  
Once the psychologist reports the incident to local law enforcement, the 
California Department of Justice will send the individual at issue a notice 
that they are prohibited from possessing or purchasing a firearm or deadly 
weapon for six months from the date of report.123  The individual may 
petition to a California court for restoration of these rights and would then be 
given an in-camera hearing to determine whether the petitioning individual 
has established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that they are able to use 
a firearm in a “safe and lawful manner.”124 
The California Code also provides that firearms rights should be revoked 
after the occurrence of several situations involving any individual who has 
been: found to be not guilty by reason of insanity in a court of law;125 found 
mentally incompetent to stand trial by a court of law;126 placed under a 
conservatorship by a court due to grave disability as a result of mental 
disorder or chronic alcoholism, provided the court finds that possession 
would present a danger to the safety of the person or others;127 or admitted to 
a facility because he has been found to be a danger to himself or others.128  
Any individual subject to these provisions is also given the right to petition a 
California court for restoration of firearms rights privileges and is 
guaranteed a hearing regarding the same within 30 days of their petition.129  	  
 120. Id. at § 8103 (amended 2014). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at § 8100(b)(1). 
 123. Id. at § 8100(b)(2). 
 124. Id. at § 8100(b)(3)(B). 
 125. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 8103(b)(1).  See also id. at § 8100(c)(1). 
 126. Id. at § 8103(d)(1) (outlining that an individual may have their rights restored if 
the committing court finds the person has been restored to competent). 
 127. Id. at § 8103(e)(1) (stating that firearms possession is only prohibited during the 
conservatorship). 
 128. Id. at § 8103(f)(1) (outlining that possession is prohibited for five years 
commencing from the time of release. The individual may petition to a court for 
restoration of rights before the five year deadline). 
 129. Id. at § 8100. 
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The common element in the provisions of the California Code referenced 
herein is that there generally must be a finding of dangerousness, either by a 
healthcare professional or judicial authority, depending on the applicable 
section of the Code.130   
A brief overview of state law indicates that several states have expanded 
restrictions for individuals believed to be a risk as a result of their mental 
state.  While such laws have the laudable goal or promoting public safety, 
the laws are also potentially over-inclusive and encompassing expansive 
categories of individuals.  California’s legislative efforts allow for the 
temporary revocation of firearms rights, which does not exist at the federal 
level.  California also involves the opinion of medical examiners and 
psychiatrists, who are trained to assess risks and warning signs associated 
with individual behavior.  
IV.  RESEARCH SURVEYING THE CONNECTION BETWEEN MENTAL ILLNESS 
AND VIOLENCE  
It is easy to accept the tautology advanced by media reports that, because 
some of the recent mass shootings in America have involved shooters with 
documented mental health issues, people with a history of mental illness 
pose a greater risk of violence than other categories of people.  To begin 
with, just as the legislative record reveals uncertainty as to the type of 
individual believed to represent a heightened risk for gun violence,131 despite 
extensive study into the relationship between mental illness and violence, 
psychological research has yielded no conclusive results.132  Instead, this 
complicated relationship has led some psychologists to caution that 
developing a “standardized, reliable, generalizable set of criteria for 
dangerous prediction in law and mental health is an elusive and distant 
objective.”133 
One apparent reason for this is that there are wide variances in study 
methodology.134   Studies, when examined together, reveal that “[e]ach 	  
 130. Id. 
 131. See supra Section II. 
 132. Charles W. Lidz, et al., Violence and Mental Illness: A New Analytical 
Approach, 31 AM. PSYCHOLOGY ASSOC. 23, 23-24 (2007) (noting that “[r]esearch has 
produced a mixed picture of the connection of mental illness and violence, with empirical 
studies varying in their conclusions about the relationship between mental illness and 
violence”).   Id. at 23.  
 133. Bonta, supra note 19, at 124.  
 134. Lidz, et al., supra, note 132, at 23-24 (reviewing a number of studies and noting 
a “mixed picture of the connection of mental illness and violence,” with some studies 
finding an integral link between psychosis and violence, and others studies indicating 
there is only a weak association between mental illness and violence, absent a co-morbid 
factor such as substanec abuse).  
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investigation suffers from some methodological shortcoming,” such as, “[a] 
lack of clarity about the definition of mental illness, use of only official 
records, inadequacy of the comparison group, and problems of retrospective 
reporting.”135 
As a preliminary matter, the term “mentally ill” encompasses a very broad 
range of cognitive behaviors136 and affects a very large portion of society.137  
It is estimated that one in four American adults experience mental illness in 
a given year, and that one in seventeen adults live with a “serious” mental 
illness, such as schizophrenia, major depression, or bipolar disorder.138  The 
United States Center for Disease Control (“CDC”), which is the national 
public health institute under the Department of Health and Human Services, 
defines “mental illness” as “collectively . . . all diagnosable mental 
disorders,” which are “health conditions that are characterized by alterations 
in thinking, mood, or behavior . . . associated with distress and/or impaired 
functioning.”139  Moreover, the range of diagnoses falling under the term 
“mental illness” has been cited as one of the limitations to the current body 
of research on behavioral health; one scientist reported that “[t]he level of 
violence found in samples of disordered individuals in the community varies 
widely, from 8 percent to about 45 percent, depending on the definitions of 
disorder and violence used.”140   This finding highlights one of several 
concerns to keep in mind when reviewing research in this area—studies of 
mental illness may include individuals who are diagnosed with a lower 
“level of disorder” (such as depression or anxiety), while other studies may 
focus on a particular disorder, such as schizophrenia, or may survey only 
serious mental illnesses collectively (such as major depression, 
schizophrenia, and bipolar disorder), leading to varied results.141 	  
 135. Edward P. Mulvey, Assessing the Evidence of a Link Between Mental Illness and 
Violence, in AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N., VIOLENT BEHAVIOR & MENTAL ILLNESS: A 
COMPENDIUM OF ARTICLES FROM PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES & HOSPITAL & COMMUNITY 
PSYCHIATRY 14, 15  (Psychiatric Res. Ctr. of the Am. Psychiatric Ass’n 1997). 
 136. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE 
SURGEON GENERAL 1 (1999). 
 137. Id. at 4. 
 138. Mental Illness Facts and Numbers, NAT’L INST. MENTAL HEALTH, available at 
http://www.nami.org/factsheets/mentalillness_factsheet.pdf (last visited May 1, 2013). 
 139. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 136, at 5.  
 140. Edward P. Mulvey, Assessing the Evidence of a Link Between Mental Illness and 
Violence, in AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N., VIOLENT BEHAVIOR AND MENTAL ILLNESS: A 
COMPENDIUM OF ARTICLES FROM PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES AND HOSPITAL AND COMMUNITY 
PSYCHIATRY 14, 15  (Psychiatric Res. Ctr. of the Am. Psychiatric Ass’n 1997). 
 141. See id.; see also Frederick E. Vars & Amanda Adcock Young, Do the Mentally 
Ill Have a Right to Bear Arms?, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 14-15 (2013). This article 
discusses a study by Jeffrey Swanson, which considered schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, 
major depression, obsessive compulsive disorder, panic disorder, substance abuse, and 
phobia. After breaking down each illness and surveying it separately, the study found that 
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Another limitation to current research is that violence is difficult to 
measure directly, so researchers have used a variety of methods to acquire 
data on acts of violence.142  The earliest studies on mental illness and 
violence, apparently beginning in the 1970s, relied on data from official 
records of documented violence.143  Specifically, several studies based their 
data on official records of violent behavior by patients who had once been 
clinically assessed as a danger to others and committed to a state hospital, 
and were subsequently released pursuant to a judicial order.144  The studies 
tracked a specific group of individuals after their release and looked for 
subsequent acts of violence after discharge, and determined that “violence 
among people with mental illness was quite rare.”145 
By the 1990s, however, study methodology changed, and researchers 
began to use a multisource approach, where studies relied on “a mixture of 
sources including self-report, collateral reports from family or friends, and 
police and medical records.”146  The new multisource approach resulted in 
“report[s] that rates of violence were much higher than had previously been 
thought” under the study methodology of the 1970s.147 
In addition to variances in reporting data and inconsistencies regarding the 
types of disorders considered, there are a variety of co-existing variables that 
may not be controlled for, but have the potential to exaggerate or cause 
differences in data, such as: the type of violence surveyed; the existence of a 
comorbid disorder like substance abuse;148 the presence and severity of 
active symptoms or psychosis;149 or certain socioeconomic factors that are 
independently linked to violent behavior.150  
Renewed research efforts have begun looking at the relationship between 
violence and mental illness by more closely examining and controlling for 
relevant variables, such as those listed above, which may serve to more 
clearly explain any association with mental illness and a propensity for 	  
schizophrenia, of the non-substance abuse disorders, had the highest association with 
violence, including with a firearm, at 8.58%, compared to .40% by individuals with no 
disorder.  Id.   
 142. See Heather Stuart, Violence and Mental Illness: An Overview, 2 WORLD 
PSYCHIATRY 121 (2003); see also Lidz, et al., supra, note 132, at 23-24. 
 143. Lidz, et al., supra, note 132, at 23-24. 
 144. Id.  
 145. Id. at 24. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. E. Fuller Torrey, Violent Behavior by Individuals with Serious Mental Illness, 
The Role of Treatment Compliance and Insight, in INSIGHT & PSYCHOSIS 269 (Xavier F. 
Amador & Anthony S. David eds., 1998). 
 149. Lidz, et al., supra, note 132, at 23-24. 
 150. Bonta, supra note 19, at 124.  
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violence.151  For example, Jeffrey Swanson, a Professor of Psychiatry and 
Behavioral Health at the Duke University School of Medicine, 152  is 
conducting a study discussing three theories on this relationship.  His 
research looks at psychopathological motivations, which reviews violent 
behavior and manifestations of mental illness; criminogenic risk exposure, 
which attributes violence to social and environmental factors; and social 
processes, which examines labels imposed by society on the mentally ill 
regarding their assumed violent disposition. 153   In addition to other 
considerations, Swanson’s study will also review the effectiveness of 
background checks and current firearms law in reducing violence in relation 
to this issue.154  Studies such as Swanson’s are important, because this 
research involves an assessment not only of behavioral or mental disorders, 
but also the impact that pervasive and negative public perception has on 
individuals suffering from such disorders. 
Research efforts have also included examining the presence of certain 
behaviorisms, deemed “warning behaviors” by one group of scientists, 
which constitute a toxic change in an individual that is evidence of an 
increased or accelerated risk for violence.155  Warning behaviors become 
relevant after an individual has raised a red flag to a particular threat 
assessor, and may help with risk management, as opposed to violence 
prediction 156    This means that, instead of attempting to predict 
dangerousness by labeling people as high or low risk based on their 
association with a particular group that may be statistically correlated with 
violence, a threat assessor (such as a medical professional) would watch for 
changes in patient behavior that tends to alert to an increased risk for 
violence.157  One study points out that, while the study of warning behaviors 
as a tool for threat assessment is not new, the typology of such warning 
behaviors should be further examined.158  Different acts of violence, such as 
work place violence, targeting a public figure, adult mass shooters, or school 
shooters, will involve different types of warning behaviors that could be 
informed by further research.  This shifts the focus from a particular group 	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of individuals, or from a particular diagnosis, to an individual, and instructs 
response based upon individual changes in behavior.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Mass shootings differ from generalized gun violence in high-crime areas 
for several reasons, one of which is that the public often perceives them as 
preventable.  These tragic events always call attention back to the gun 
control debate, particularly in the form of demands for the expansion of the 
background check system.  As indicated, the background check system is 
dependent upon the presence and quality of records of individuals 
disqualified under federal law, or local law where relevant.  Disqualifying 
records can only be effective in catching potentially risky individuals if they 
are correct in assuming a higher degree of risk based on an affiliation with a 
particular subgroup of the population.  
The statutory scheme of the Gun Control Act depends on the validity of 
language identifying risky individuals, including those being adjudicated as 
having a mental defect or being committed to a mental institution.  
Notwithstanding the ambiguity surrounding what constitutes a “mental 
defect,” as scientists have warned, it is impractical to rely on mental 
defectiveness, even if clearly defined, as a prediction for dangerousness.  As 
federal courts struggle to interpret the legislative intent behind the statutory 
language of the Gun Control Act, states have moved forward to enact their 
own legislation identifying categories of people state legislators feel should 
be prohibited from possessing guns.  States like California have developed 
laws that provide for the temporary revocation of firearms rights, and also 
allowed for judicial procedures that account for individual due process 
rights.  California’s legislation gives greater deference to the opinion of 
health care professionals, who are presumably more skilled in identifying 
individuals who create an increased risk for violence, to alert authorities to 
such persons.  
